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Abstract
Aims: This article assesses the efficiency of six Nordic state-controlled gambling companies in
raising revenue for their host societies, and the terms under which they operate. Finland, Sweden,
Denmark and Norway have established gambling monopolies on the grounds that they help to
prevent fraud and money laundering, and channel proceeds to their host societies. Within the last
decade, Denmark (2012) and Sweden (2019) have opened substantial parts of their gambling
markets to competition, whereas Finland and Norway continue to uphold monopolies. Design:
The analysis is based on publicly disclosed income statements and financial reporting concerning
Nordic gambling operators for the year 2017. We calculated how much they contribute to
societies, what are the costs, and how these figures compare among the companies. Results: We
found that Veikkaus raises the highest amounts of surplus to society both in absolute terms and in
relative numbers, and that, overall, the companies vary in efficiency. We discuss the reasons for
these differences, focusing on their respective product portfolios, institutional frameworks and
competitive market positions. Conclusions: The results problematise the measurement of effi-
ciency in gambling companies in monetary terms. Efficiency depends on high total consumption
with little regard to the principles of responsible gambling and the prevention of gambling prob-
lems. Nordic countries have a strong commitment to the protection of health, but in the case of
gambling, protecting the monopoly seems to outweigh harm prevention.
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Following significant drops in corporate tax
revenue since the 1980s, the burden of taxation
has increasingly shifted to the individual
(OECD, 2016, see also Nikkinen et al., 2018).
This also increases interest in excise duty,
including (implicit) taxes on gambling (Clotfel-
ter, 2005). Given the tendency in governments
nowadays to locate the gambling agency in the
Ministry of Finance (instead of the Ministry of
Health, for example), the focus may be more on
the revenue from gambling than on the inevita-
ble costs (Room & Nicoll, 2020).
Much of the damage caused by gambling (in
terms of treatment, family problems and
inequalities, for example) is hidden and easily
overlooked in economic cost-benefit analyses
(and impact studies are not cost-benefit studies,
Grinols, 2011). Intangible costs are not easily
shown, and incontrovertible proof is not always
possible in public health research which works
in a complex environment (Cassidy, 2020). It
has therefore been easy for governments not to
focus on harm prevention, and to expand gam-
bling opportunities rather than to raise income
taxes (Adams, 2008, 2016; Orford, 2011).
Moreover, revenue growth does not seem to
depend on other economic trends, but rather
reflects the availability and promotion of gam-
bling opportunities (Cassidy, 2020; Orford,
2019; Sulkunen et al., 2019).
Gambling companies tend to make signifi-
cant profits related to their pricing practices
(Levitt, 2004), although some comparative
studies have shown that monopolistic concerns
may make less profit than businesses operating
in more loosely regulated markets (Chambers,
2011; Paldam, 2008). However, this could
relate to the understanding of profit as private
gain rather than as something to be transferred
to societies (see Nikkinen & Marionneau, 2014
for a more detailed discussion about the public
and common good in this context). Raising
funds for society has been one of the main jus-
tifications for the existence of national gam-
bling operations and monopolies (e.g.,
Marionneau et al., 2018).
This justification for upholding a monopoly
over public gambling, to channel the proceeds
to the host society, has been often challenged in
forums such as the EU courts (European Com-
mission, 2012; Rydman & Tukia, 2019). The
channelling of gambling proceeds creates a sit-
uation in which the monopoly promotes and
markets its services to its own populace but
limits access to other gambling offerings. This,
in itself, incurs costs in that it increases the need
for control, and the enforcement of online gam-
bling regulations in particular (for more infor-
mation about such measures in the EU, see
Hörnle et al., 2019).
Given the costs involved in the collection of
gambling proceeds, one might wonder whether
gambling companies are efficient in this
respect. Efficiency in the field of economics is
usually defined as attaining organisational
goals at minimal cost. As such, it can be eval-
uated quantitatively by calculating the net ben-
efit, when costs are deducted from income/
revenue. This (prevalent) approach has been
criticised on the grounds that all efficiency cal-
culations are relative rather than absolute, given
that the presumption of unique causes and
effects is based on determinist ontology (Wolff,
2002). In the realm of healthcare, for example,
economic efficiency cannot be the sole basis on
which optional functionality is evaluated. Ques-
tions related to issues such as priorities have
ideological elements and cannot be resolved
solely with reference to health economics (Nik-
kinen, 2011). This also applies to gambling, in
that “efficiency” cannot be measured simply in
terms of operational efficiency.
The term efficiency is used in at least three
different contexts in studies on gambling. First,
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a body of research has focused on measuring
and testing the market efficiency of different
games (e.g., Even & Noble, 1992; Paul &
Weinbach, 2002; Zuber et al., 1983). The the-
oretical basis of this is the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH), which was originally devel-
oped in the context of stock markets and invest-
ment to analyse how well prizing reflects
available information, and whether it is possible
to “beat the market” (Fama, 1991). Second, the
efficiency of gambling provision has been
assessed from the perspective of raising tax rev-
enue (e.g., Farrell & Walker, 1999; Gulley &
Scott, 1989; Rodgers & Stuart, 1995; Smith,
2000). Third, and related to the previous point,
gambling products have been priced to maxi-
mise revenue as a measure of efficiency. It has
been shown that the demand for such products
is price-elastic (see, e.g., Gallet, 2015; Swiss
Institute of Comparative Law, 2006), meaning
that players are sensitive to prices and this lim-
its the possibilities for both governments and
operators to use gambling as a revenue source
(Gallet, 2015; Landers, 2008).
It is clear from the aforementioned sources
that the efficiency of gambling companies tend
to be assessed in financial terms. An additional
premise in the Nordic countries is that gambling
is an effective source of revenue for public
spending. An additional premise in the Nordic
countries is that gambling is an efficient source
of revenue for public spending. It is this asser-
tion that we evaluate here. Our starting point is
to analyse the financial statements of Nordic
state-operated gambling companies in terms
of their economic performance and/or
“efficiency” in an economic sense. Our reason
for focusing on these companies is that the Nor-
dic countries generally levy high income taxes,
combined with value-added taxation (VAT),
but they also use excise taxation to fund the
provision of public services. The levels of gam-
bling taxation on these operations and the div-
idends paid to owners (such as governments,
trotting associations and various non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)) are there-
fore likely to be high, whereas the operators’
share is likely to be minimal. Monopolistic struc-
tures and barriers to entry alongside systemic
efficiency have been shown to create economic
surplus, or monopoly rent (Harvey, 2002;
Kaplinsky, 2000). More specifically with regard
to the gambling sector, additional profit is also
generated by significant producer surplus arising
from low production costs in relation to bets, and
what Young and Markham (2017) call the addic-
tion surplus, i.e., the overconsumption of gam-
bling by those who gamble at harmful levels
(see, e.g., Fiedler et al., 2019; Schull, 2012).
Data and methods
The companies in question
The analysis covers six state-controlled operators
in the Nordic countries, as described in Table 1.
Four of the companies are under full state own-
ership; ATG is owned by Swedish horse-racing
associations, but is nevertheless a special-
purpose company, under state-control through its
board of directors (the Swedish state appoints half
of the directors, including the chair).
The analysed companies differ in their prod-
uct portfolios and the relative importance of
different games in their financial results. Elec-
tronic gambling machines (EGMs) are the most
profitable for Veikkaus, the total revenue
obtained from them being remarkably high, as
explained in detail below. The share of EGM
revenue is lower in the case of Svenska Spel
and Norsk Tipping. The removal in 2007 of
EGMs from public places in Norway, and their
subsequent replacement gradually in 2008-
2009 with less addictive Multix and Belago
machines, caused a substantial drop in EGM
and overall gambling revenue (Hamar, 2017).
Lottery games produce a relatively large share
of the total profits of Danske Spil and Norsk
Tipping. Danske Spil has a monopoly status
in providing lotteries, and most of its revenue
derives from this privilege. In the case of
Svenska Spel, scratch cards (especially a game
called Triss) constitute a comparably signifi-
cant revenue source, up to one-third.
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The companies also differ in terms of market
share. Although only Denmark and Sweden
have licensed their gambling sectors to outside
providers, each country faces competition from
offshore operators. Veikkaus has the highest
overall market share, at approximately 85%
(H2 estimate also used in its annual reporting,
Veikkaus, 2019). Ålands Penningautomatfören-
ing (Paf), operating from the Finnish autono-
mous region of Åland, facilitates much of the
“unauthorised” gambling in mainland Finland,
but there are also offshore operators. Norsk Tip-
ping and Norsk Rikstoto combined control
about 84% of the overall market in Norway, but
the online figure is much lower: only an esti-
mated 45% (SEB, 2018). Svenska Spel and
ATG combined controlled only 57% of Swe-
den’s total gambling market in 2017, before it
was opened to licensing in 2019. The rest was
shared among NGO-operated lotteries and
bingo and unlicensed gambling operators
(Swedish Gambling Authority, 2018). The mar-
ket share of Svenska Spel may continue to
diminish with increasing competition: 98 gam-
bling licences have been issued (as of August
2020), of which most are for online only and
include Paf. However, there is another route
available to monopoly operators in the form
of a licensing system: Danske Spil in Denmark
controls about 60% of the overall market, and
its share has been steadily growing since the
introduction of licensing (Danske Spil/Gam-
bling Compliance profile).
Companies that we excluded from the anal-
ysis, for methodological reasons, included
operators functioning in licensed or charity
markets in Denmark and Sweden, small-scale
lottery and raffle providers, as well as the
above-mentioned Paf, which operates all gam-
bling in Åland. Many charities, especially in
Sweden, for instance, do not have a legal obli-
gation to publish detailed annual reports, and
may choose merely to issue a report of annual
activities containing selected fiscal data. In the
case of licensed operations, many are run by
companies owned by multinational corpora-
tions that do not necessarily provide financial
information in each and every country in which
they operate. The same also applies to Paf,
which resulted in incomparable differences in
reported data. Moreover, the analysis con-
cerned the year 2017 and therefore does not
take into account licensed companies operating
in Swedish online markets in 2019.
Table 1. Companies included in the analysis.
Company Country Ownership structure Exclusivities Game portfolio




Monopoly for tote betting Tote betting
Danske
Spil
Denmark State 80%, sports
associations 20%




Norway State 100% Monopoly for tote betting Tote betting
Norsk
Tipping
















Note. EGMs ¼ electronic gambling machines.
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Data
The data consist of the financial reporting of the
six companies in their income statements (IS)
that are required by the Acts related to book-
keeping and which are published annually by
each gambling operator. These statements
reveal how much of the total gambling revenue
(R) is paid out as winnings, how much is levied
in the form of tax, direct contributions, divi-
dends to public shareholders (SS) and, in more
or less detail, the operational costs of the com-
panies, the remaining profit and its allocation.
When we found gaps in the IS reporting we
looked through the rest of the report for addi-
tional data.
If there was a lack of adequate data to suit
our study purposes, we contacted gambling-
operator representatives and regulators in the
spring of 2019. However, only Norsk Rikstoto
and Veikkaus provided somewhat detailed
information about their game portfolios and
gross gambling revenue (GGR) that we were
able to check against market data provided by
Gambling Compliance. Because of this, and the
otherwise differing reporting detail, certain data
are missing that would have provided further
explanation of why some companies are more
efficient at collecting gambling revenue for
public use than others. Notably with regard to
this article, we could not analyse the financial
figures and return percentages on the product
level.
The data collected are from the year 2017.
Because they are cross-sectional, we controlled
for the robustness of the figures by checking the
previous three years’ EBITDA figures (earn-
ings before interest, tax, depreciation and amor-
tisation). These figures show how much money
gambling operators can generate from their
operations, excluding non-operational variables
such as earlier investments, financial costs or
revenues, and taxation. As such, they eliminate
the effects of financial and capital expenditure
and allow control for whether 2017 was in any
way exceptional. However, this situation did
not arise even in the case of Veikkaus, which
had gone through a merger of three national
operators (The Finnish Slot Machine Associa-
tion RAY, the national lottery Veikkaus, and
the national tote betting company FinToto) in
2017. The gambling situation in Sweden, Nor-
way and Denmark was relatively stable in 2017
(Denmark changed to licensing in 2012, and
Sweden after 2017, in 2019).
Analytical methods
The main categories in IS reporting are total
revenue, taxes, direct contributions (applying
mainly to Veikkaus, ATG, Norsk Tipping and
Norsk Rikstoto), operating costs, financial rev-
enue and costs, and accounting profit. We cal-
culated a sum figure based on these items,
which we call gambling surplus to society
(Sg): it is the sum of all taxes, licence costs (not
applicable to Nordic government-controlled
operators), dividends to public shareholders and
earmarked contributions. Not all companies
contribute to public funds through each chan-
nel. The main types of Sg also differ in Nordic
operations. In the cases of Veikkaus, Norsk
Tipping, Norsk Rikstoto and ATG it is mostly
earmarked contributions, whereas for Svenska
Spel and Danske Spil, the main channel for
allocating proceeds is in the form of dividends
to public shareholders. All companies (except
Norsk Tipping) also pay varying levels of taxes
(employer taxes not accounted for in this
context).
The gambling surplus to society (Sg)
depends on the total operating costs (C), includ-
ing marketing, personnel and distribution costs.
We chose these cost elements on the basis of
our initial scan of the income statements, which
showed that they were the most significant indi-
vidual categories, and because they have been
identified as the major cost items for gambling
companies (Marionneau & Nikkinen, 2020).
Costs here refer only to the operating costs of
gambling companies, and do not include social
costs generated by gambling, for example.
We compared the figures to the companies’
gross total revenue (GTR), meaning the
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revenue that remains after winnings have been
paid out, and includes other non-gambling rev-
enue (such as food and beverages in casinos
operated by the companies). This revenue was
marginal in the analysed companies, which
reflects the situation in the Nordic countries
with its few brick-and-mortar casinos and total
lack of casino hotels as in Las Vegas, for exam-
ple. GTR is preferred to total turnover (R),
which is more sensitive to variations in return
percentages and differences in game portfolios
that could not be accounted for. The indicators
(and their usage) are explained in more detail
below:
1. Sg/GTR (%) shows the proportion of
gross total revenue (GTR) that is allo-
cated to society, either states or other
beneficiaries.
2. C/GTR (%) shows the proportion of
gross total revenue (GTR) that is con-
sumed in operating costs (not including
taxes and financial investment costs).
This enables the comparison of compa-
nies in terms of efficiency in that it
shows how much it costs for them to
collect gambling proceeds.
3. Marketing/GTR (%) shows the pro-
portion of gross total revenue (GTR)
that is directed to marketing and
advertising costs, excluding sponsor-
ships and game organisation because
these data were not available for most
companies.
4. Personnel/GTR (%) shows the propor-
tion of gross total revenue (GTR) that
is directed to employment costs.
5. Distribution/GTR (%) shows the pro-
portion of gross total revenue (GTR)
that is directed to distribution costs,
i.e., the re-sale network.
6. C/Sg shows how much it costs to pro-
duce a certain amount of gambling rev-
enue for the host society, by comparing
the cost of gambling surplus to society.
The monetary figures in the analysis are
given in euro using the currency exchange rate
of 31 December 2017. We have also converted
all the sums into PPP (purchasing power parity)
euros based on the 2017 rates provided by the
World Bank and the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development).
The PPP figures are adjusted for the differences
in price levels between the countries.
Results
Efficiency in raising the surplus to society
Table 2 shows the main financial returns (gross
total revenue, surplus to society and Sg/GTR
(%)) of the companies, ranked from highest to
lowest in terms of Sg/GTR percentage. The
highest percentage means that the company
contributes the largest share of its GTR to soci-
ety and is in these terms the most efficient.
The figures presented in Table 2 call for at
least two observations. First, in general, the
Table 2. GTR and Sg raised by Nordic government-controlled gambling companies (in millions or as
percentages).
Company GTR, M€ GTR, PPP M€ Sg, M€ Sg, PPP M€ Sg/GTR, %
Veikkaus 1781.8 1408.1 1227.4 970.0 68.9
ATG 502.6 378.2 340.5 256.3 67.8
Norsk Tipping 805.7 539.7 531.3 355.9 65.9
Norsk Rikstoto 134.1 89.8 74.2 49.7 55.3
Danske Spil 494.4 504.6 268.3 273.9 54.3
Svenska Spel 961.7 723.7 487.5 366.9 50.7
Note. GTR ¼ gross total revenue; PPP ¼ purchasing power parity; Sg ¼ gambling surplus to society.
Source: Annual reports, 2017.
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companies that produce the most GTR also pro-
duce more Sg in absolute monetary terms. This
is not attributable to overall market size.
Although Sweden is the most populous of the
Nordic countries with ten million inhabitants,
the gross gambling revenue of Svenska Spel
and ATG combined does not reach the level
reported by Veikkaus, which operates in Fin-
land with a population of 5.5 million. This may
be attributable in part, but not entirely, to the
lower market share of the Swedish state-
operated gambling companies (only 57% in
comparison to 85% for Veikkaus). Danske Spil
has a similar market share to that of Svenska
Spel and ATG (60%), but it nevertheless pro-
duces even less GTR and Sg. At the same time,
the Norwegian government-controlled gam-
bling companies (Norsk Tipping and Norsk
Rikstoto) have about the same market share as
Veikkaus (84%), and yet the GGR (and subse-
quently Sg produced in Norway) is notably
lower than in Finland.
It should be noted that we are comparing
companies and not countries, and that the over-
all contribution of gambling to the host coun-
tries of these companies in the cases of Sweden
and Denmark is higher than the figures for
Danske Spil, Svenska Spel and ATG alone.
Society also benefits from operators in
charity-based (mostly NGO-operated lotteries)
and licensed markets in both of these countries.
Moreover, some winnings channelled to opera-
tors in Denmark other than Danske Spil are
subject to income taxation, producing addi-
tional revenue that is not analysed here.
Our second observation relates to the fact
that the Sg share of company GTR varies quite
significantly. Veikkaus provides the highest
amount of surplus to society in absolute num-
bers, and also proportionally, and both ATG
and Norsk Tipping come relatively close. On
the other hand, Svenska Spel, Danske Spil and
Norsk Rikstoto produce less surplus to their
host societies in proportion to their GTR. We
consider the reasons for this in the second part
of the Results section.
Factors influencing efficiency in the raising
of Sg
There appear to be at least three possible rea-
sons why some companies are proportionately
more efficient in producing surplus to society
than others. These reasons relate to return per-
centages and product portfolios, institutional
differences in terms of levies on gambling oper-
ations, and operating costs. We do not evaluate
the impact of return percentages here because
this was not possible on the product level. We
also removed their effect from the analysis by
comparing the figures to GTR rather than total
revenue.
The impact of product portfolios and return
percentages has been explored in a previous
study comparing Finnish and Norwegian mar-
kets (Marionneau & Lähteenmaa, 2020).
According to the findings, differences in terms
of efficiency in producing surplus to society
could be attributable to the absolute gambling
volumes: Norwegian operators rely more heav-
ily on slow games with low return percentages
(lotteries, as well as sports betting), whereas
Finnish Veikkaus relies on fast EGMs with high
return percentages. Nevertheless, Finnish
EGMs generate high volumes of gambling (due
to the fast pace and high addictive consump-
tion), which translate into high profits and
thereby contributions to society. This observa-
tion is confirmed here, too.
By way of comparison, Finland has one
EGM per approx. 200 adult inhabitants, cf. 1
EGM/1,600 in Sweden and 1 EGM/1,400 in
Norway (note: the year used in here is 2017,
in Finland the amount has changed). Veikkaus
generates 46.2% of its GTR from EGMs, as
opposed to only about 10% for Svenska Spel
and nine per cent for Norsk Tipping (Norsk Tip-
ping, 2018). Furthermore, Norsk Tipping EGMs
(Multix and Belago terminals), with a number
of “safe-play” features built into their design,
have much lower addictive potential than
Veikkaus-operated EGMs.
The impact of institutional differences in
terms of taxation and levies is minor, given that
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all six companies are state-operated or con-
trolled and distribute their profits back to the
state as earmarked contributions or dividends,
in addition to taxation. None of them had sub-
stantial residual leftover profit, and none of
them paid dividends to investors or other pri-
vate shareholders. Despite their differing mar-
ket shares in the respective jurisdictions, they
are all able to generate large amounts of gam-
bling revenue for their host governments (and
beneficiaries) on account of their monopolistic
or semi-monopolistic status. Unusually high
profits or surplus raised in a monopolistic or
restricted market situation have also been
reported in previous literature on monopoly
rent (Harvey, 2002).
The impact of operating costs becomes
apparent when comparing Sg and total costs
to GTR. Overall, when considering all the
included companies, those operators with the
highest volumes also have the highest costs.
However, the total share of Sg grows faster than
the total share of costs. whereas Sg grows by
0.7:1 in terms of GTR, costs only grow by
0.3:1. In other words, the surplus to society
grows more quickly than operating costs as
GTR grows, but taken together Sg and C
explain where the total amount of growth in
GTR is spent. This finding is in line with Young
and Markham’s (2017) suggestion that surplus
from gambling results partly from the fact that
the level of production costs is not dependent
on the size of the bets.
Bet size refers to the average for each bet,
whereas the figure shows the cost relative to the
total volume of operations ¼ GTR. Because of
economies of scale, unit costs grow less than
the total volume in almost any line of industrial
production. However, this cannot be the only
explanation in here, since definition of “unit”
is difficult as gambling is more of immaterial
service with addictive potential. The question
is, where do economies of scale come from in
this field? The answer is that EGMs are cheaper
to run than low-percentage RTP games, hence
Veikkaus is relatively more cost-efficient than
the others.
Table 3 shows the operational costs of the
companies in relation to their GTR. High oper-
ating costs appear to explain the low efficiency
in raising surplus to society, and vice versa: the
order of companies in terms of costs is a mirror
image of that in terms of Sg. In other words,
although costs grow in absolute numbers, their
share of GTR drops when volumes grow.
Some of the specific cost items, which are
also shown in Table 3, could partly explain the
differences between the companies. Of particu-
lar interest is why Svenska Spel seems to per-
form poorly in terms of efficiency, even though
in 2017 it (theoretically) controlled much of the
land-based and online gambling, as Veikkaus
and Norsk Tipping did. Danske Spil made a
major IT investment in 2017, thus its position
was somewhat lower than it perhaps would
have been in a normal year. However, this
should be verified in a longitudinal analysis.
The cost items selected for this analysis
relate to each other and could explain some of
the differences. First, companies with high
Table 3. The main costs of Nordic gambling companies relative to GTR (%).
Company C/GTR (%) Advertising/GTR (%) Personnel/GTR (%) Distribution/GTR (%)
Veikkaus 30.7 1.3 5.9 9.2
ATG 30.2 n/a 6.0 n/a
Norsk Tipping 33.4 3.9 5.0 9.7
Norsk Rikstoto 44.5 11.3 7.4 14.4
Danske Spil 45.5 n/a 7.0 14.3
Svenska Spel 49.1 5.3* 11.8 n/a
Note. C ¼ total operating costs; GTR ¼ gross total revenue.
*Not including online marketing.
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operating costs also have high marketing costs,
probably because of market competition.
Although market share does not appear to be
the main explanatory factor in terms of how
efficient companies are in producing Sg and
GTR, it seems to affect how much they have
to spend to stay afloat. In 2017, whereas Den-
mark had already introduced a licensing sys-
tem, Svenska Spel faced competition from
both domestic charity-based and foreign off-
shore operators. It does not have a monopoly
of lotteries in Sweden, and it had to compete
with various NGOs that also provide lotteries.
Moreover, it faced stronger offshore competi-
tion in the online market than Veikkaus or
Norsk Tipping. The Svenska Spel online mar-
ket share was only 34.5% in 2017 (Lotteriin-
spektionen, 2018), whereas Norsk Tipping
controlled 45% and Veikkaus controlled 67%
(H2 / Borenius, 2019; 2018 figure used instead
of 2017). This competitive situation is likely to
be reflected in the high marketing costs for
Svenska Spel compared to Norsk Tipping or
Veikkaus.
Unfortunately, no figures for Danske Spil
are available, but it is likely that its marketing
costs were significant. The Danish lottery mar-
ket did not grow in 2012–2017 due to market
saturation, thus the only opportunity for Danske
Spil to increase its market share was in the
highly competitive online market (Spillemyn-
digheden, 2019, Gambling Compliance,
2020). The Finnish and Norwegian lottery mar-
kets are not growing either. However, reliance
on EGMs and other fast games for growth in
Finland may also mean lower marketing costs,
particularly given the prohibition of marketing
these types of games according to the Finnish
Lotteries Act (apart from in online environ-
ments among customers who are registered
users of the Veikkaus website). Brick-and-
mortar operators with multiple sales outlets and
EGMs do not need a high marketing budget,
either. Furthermore, many NGOs and other
actors in Finland that partake in Veikkaus pro-
ceeds carry the logo on their websites and in
their own materials in acknowledgement of the
support provided by gambling proceeds. This
further decreases the need in Veikkaus for a
high marketing and advertising budget, albeit
it is currently among the largest in Finland.
Second, some companies are more labour-
intensive than others. Labour costs grow along-
side the increasing proportional share of total
GTR costs, which may reflect differences in
product portfolios. Electronic gambling
machines and (licensed) online gambling
require a minimal workforce. ATG and Norsk
Rikstoto do not offer EGM gambling but they
do operate strongly in the online environment,
where they need few personnel. Norsk Tipping
relies heavily on lotteries, which are relatively
cheap to organise given that only a few draws
are held weekly and the results are reported via
online channels. Tote betting, on the other
hand, is more expensive to operate in that
games are sold both on and off the track. The
high personnel costs for Svenska Spel could
perhaps be attributed to its casino and venue-
based operations: casinos are known to require
a substantial labour force, and this has even
been used as a policy option to increase local
employment (e.g., Richard, 2010).
Third, companies with high total operating
costs also have high distribution costs, which
consist of commissions paid to agents for sell-
ing their products and contribute significantly
to total costs. Agency fees paid by Veikkaus for
selling gambling products to businesses in
2017, for example, were worth as much as the
Finnish Government paid in financial support
for all three major merchant shipping compa-
nies operating in Finland (i.e., Viking Line, Tal-
link Silja and Finnlines) in a three-year period
of 2015–2017 (Kauppalehti, 2019).
It was also found in a previous study on the
magnitude of commissions to agents given by
European gambling operators (Marionneau &
Nikkinen, 2020) that such costs could be as
high as 30% of the company’s gross gambling
revenue. Figures for the Nordic companies are
moderate by comparison, but they nevertheless
show some variation that could reflect the
importance of online channel and product
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portfolios. Although full figures for Sweden are
not available, it is likely that the re-sale of pop-
ular scratch tickets requires significant commis-
sions to agents whereas online games require
none. In 2017, for example, 41.9% of Veikkaus
sales were on the digital channel, and 59% of
ATG’s sales were online.
In conclusion, it appears that costs play a
major role in accounting for the differences in
efficiency among Nordic state-controlled gam-
bling companies with regard to raising surplus
to society. Table 4 shows the relationship
between total operating costs and gambling sur-
plus to society.
In terms of efficiency, the lower the figures,
the better. However, although Veikkaus does
outperform the other companies, proportio-
nately it is not very exceptional, and not much
more efficient than ATG or Norsk Tipping.
Figure 1 shows the societal contribution of
gambling operators relative to total costs in gra-
phic form. Companies operating in the compet-
itive market (Svenska Spel and Danske Spil)
are clearly above the regression line, whereas
those with a relatively high market share in
their domestic markets are below it. This indi-
cates that market competition, alongside the
product portfolio, is significant in terms of
explaining differences in the share of total oper-
ating costs, as we suggest above in our detailed
analysis of some of the cost items.
Discussion
The results reported in this article show that the
amount of public revenue received from gam-
bling companies depends largely on the volume
of operations, market share, and total operating
costs. Differences in operating costs are attribu-
table to the different product portfolios and
varying market shares of operators, but also to
differences in personnel costs, marketing
expenses and retail commissions. Market com-
petition is most relevant in determining market-
ing expenses. Based on our material, we are
able both to draw conclusions from the results,
but, perhaps even importantly, also to point out
what cannot be stated based on currently
Table 4. Costs relative to gambling surplus to
society, C/Sg.
1. Veikkaus (Finland) 0.45
2. ATG (Sweden) 0.45
3. Norsk Tipping (Norway) 0.51
4. Norsk Rikstoto (Norway) 0.81
5. Danske Spil (Denmark) 0.84
6. Svenska Spel (Sweden) 0.97
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Figure 1. Surplus to society (Sg) relative to total operating costs (C), in millions of PPP euros.
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available research evidence, and most notably
financial reporting.
First, our results explain why some compa-
nies, notably Finnish Veikkaus, seem at first
glance to be doing better than other Nordic
state-controlled gambling enterprises. How-
ever, from another perspective, the large sur-
plus to society collected by Veikkaus does not
necessarily reflect a much more efficient busi-
ness model. Instead, it is indicative of reliance
on fast EGM games and its privileged position
in the Finnish market that shields it from com-
petition. Electronic gambling machines enable
rapid, repetitive and continuous play in the pro-
cess of collecting money from Finnish players.
This also promotes addiction, since high avail-
ability combined with more gambling often
means more harm (Rossow, 2019) and EGMs
inarguably being among most harmful forms of
gambling (Livingstone et al., 2019; Schull,
2012; Selin et al., 2017). They also serve to
normalise gambling given their placement in
everyday environments (shops, kiosks and
cafes).
In terms of addressing EGM harm, Finland
lags behind Sweden (which removed most of its
EGMs from public spaces in the 1970s) and
Norway (which reduced the numbers of EGMs
dramatically in 2007–2009 and introduced
mandatory identification of players). The
removal of EGMs from public spaces in Fin-
land was also proposed in a report by the
National Institute for Health and Welfare
(THL) given to then-Minister of Family Affairs
and Social Services in 2017 (Selin et al., 2017),
and in a citizens’ initiative in 2019, but without
much effect so far. However, the situation may
change since several political parties have
recently indicated their willingness to remove
EGMs from the public sphere as well as follow-
ing the temporary closures of EGMs during the
COVID-19 crisis.
Second, the decline in market share among
authorised Nordic gambling operators forces
them not only to compete by means of aggres-
sive marketing but also to expand their product
ranges and increase the proportion of fast
games in their portfolios (Marionneau et al.,
2018). As gambling moves increasingly online,
customers have more choice of games that are
rapid and more rewarding in terms of bonuses,
prizes and return percentages. If the Nordic
government-controlled gambling companies
wish to retain their market positions, they must
increase their return percentages and bonuses,
or create more addictive game portfolios. In so
doing, however, they would dilute their respon-
sibility stance (Sulkunen, 2019).
Importantly, what our results do not show is
the relevancy of “responsible gambling” poli-
cies which are also emphasised by Nordic
government-owned monopolies. Since the
focus here is on monetary allocations, it appears
that the more competitive the market environ-
ment is, the less able gambling operators are to
channel the monies to their host societies. In the
international (online) market environment,
being a “responsible” operator does not pay.
Sweden has not able to gather exceptional rev-
enue since it does not control an increasing and
competitive online market environment,
through its government-owned gambling opera-
tors. Danske Spil in Denmark has been able to
rely its lottery operations, but this market in
Europe is mostly saturated, compared to online
gambling and fast games. Veikkaus in Finland
has been able to collect much of its proceeds via
land-based operations (EGMs), but in case it
has to remove the EGMs from shops and gro-
cery stores in the (near) future, this revenue
stream most likely cannot be upheld. In Nor-
way, revenue from lotteries and other slow-
paced games creates a situation in which much
of the online gambling is conducted with
foreign-based operators, raising the question
whether a market share of less than 50% still
constitutes a monopoly.
Conclusion
In this article, we embarked in a research effort
to find out whether Nordic gambling operators
are “efficient”. These findings call into question
the justification of state-operated gambling.
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While the Nordic countries are strongly com-
mitted to advancing public health, in the case of
gambling the proceeds seem to outweigh the
harm to the population. The Finnish Lotteries
Act (23.11.2001/1047, updated 21.12.2016/
1286) states that a gambling monopoly is justi-
fiable to prevent and reduce gambling-related
harm, but such legal justification does not
appear to be in line with the economic realities
of raising profit for society. The proceeds from
gambling in Finland do not necessarily benefit
the geographical areas from which they are col-
lected (Roukka & Salonen, 2019). Moreover,
Finnish EGMs are disproportionally placed in
poor neighbourhoods (Raisamo et al., 2019).
Thus, it is questionable whether Nordic ideals
of equal and fair society are been advanced
through gambling, even though the proceeds
are in many cases allocated to “good causes”.
Much of the Nordic gambling profit also
derives either from a very small number of
gamblers (Salonen et al., 2019) or from highly
addictive gambling forms such as EGMs and
players who have issues with their gambling
(Public Health Agency of Sweden, 2019). The
case of Norway shows that effective limits on
the government’s ability to target its own citi-
zens for public revenue collection (i.e.,
obligatory pre-commitment) leads operators
to rely on less addictive game forms that are,
subsequently, also able to gather less profit and/or
lose market shares in the online environment.
However, this approach does protect the land-
based gamblers efficiently, since only a few
helpline calls emanate from use of gambling
machines. In such a situation, issuing personal
gambling licences (cf. driving licences and
permits to carry weapons) might be a better
option than responsible gambling campaigns in
terms of further enhancing player protection
(Nikkinen, 2019).
What was not shown in this kind of effi-
ciency analysis is that responsible gambling
policies would otherwise have any impact on
revenue collection. Other commentators before
us have claimed that “responsible gambling”
practices appear to be ineffective and to serve
the fiscal interests of governments (Adams,
2020; Cassidy et al., 2013; Hancock & Smith,
2017; Livingstone, 2020). A profit or effi-
ciency-driven approach to gambling is not in
line with decreasing gambling harm within
populations. Instead, the efficiency of any com-
pany is, of necessity, measured in such a man-
ner that the role of responsible gambling offer is
either negligible or cannot be shown at all.
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